The advanced electronic units with wireless capabilities inside modern vehicles have, enhanced the driving experience, but also introduced a myriad of security problems due to the inherent limitations of the internal communication protocol. In the last two decades, a number of security threats have been identified and accordingly, security measures have been proposed. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of security threats and countermeasures for the ubiquitous CAN bus communication protocol. Our review of the existing literature leads us to a observation of an overlooked simple, cost-effective, and incrementally deployable solution. Essentially, a reverse firewall, referred to in this paper as an icewall, can be an effective defense against a major class of packet-injection attacks and many denial of service attacks. We cover the fundamentals of the icewall in this paper. Further, by introducing the notion of human-in-the-loop, we discuss the subtle implications to its security when a human driver is accounted for.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing sophistication of electronic components in modern vehicles has made driving more pleasant, comfortable, and in some cases, safer. The interconnectivity of the electronic sensors and actuators, and their configurability helps fine-tune the driving experience, in turn leading to increasing the prevalence and sophistication of these components. Over the years, the new components and their interplay complexity have led to user-installable data and firmware updates, requiring extra-vehicular connectivity over wireless protocols.
At the centre of most intra-vehicular communication lies the CAN bus which connects the electronic control units (ECUs) inside the vehicle. At the time of its inception and subsequent revisions, the CAN specification was developed to meet the real-time communication needs of a vehicle [11] , [52] , [10] , without significant concern for security. Unfortunately, as vehicle manufacturers started adding remote interfaces to ECUs while still following the CAN 2.0 standard (which never had a securityfocused revision), the inherent security limitations started to become an issue. Over the years, a lot of CAN bus vulnerabilities that can lead to serious consequences have been identified.
In the vehicle security domain, there are mainly two (not mutually exclusive) classes of research: the first class focuses on identifying security threats (vulnerabilities, attack surfaces and/or exploits) and the second class focuses on proposing security measures. One of the earliest works in identifying the security threats to the automotive bus systems is that of Wolf et al. in [54] . For the most part, their work covers potential incentives for prospective attackers to hack into the bus, the potential access points that can be used and the safety and comfort implications of successful attacks. They also look into general security measures that can be used to protect access to the bus. Their work, however, fails to provide a practical example of an attack on the bus, nor it provides concrete implementation details of the discussed security measures. Following on their footsteps, few years later, Koscher et al., in [24] , investigate inherent weaknesses in the CAN protocol, look into flaws in the real-world implementation of the protocol (deviations from the standard being one) and perform practical attacks on the bus. A few years further, Miller and Valasek, in [29] , [31] , open up the true range of automotive attack possibilities. Their work in [29] covers a broad range of attacks leading to the control of different vehicle functionalitiese, such as, braking, steering and acceleration, through physical access to the bus. Similarly, attacks that can be carried out remotely are discussed in [31] .
Somewhat parallel to the discovery of security threats on the CAN bus, a different body of work started to look into proposing security solutions to the identified threats -some of the earlier works in this regard are [35] and [17] . Claimed by the authors to be the first efficient data authentication scheme for the automotive network, [35] is centered on a delayed message authentication based on compound message authentication codes. Similarly, [17] covers intrusion detection techniques based on three detection patterns: increased message frequency, obvious use of message-IDs and low level communication characteristics to detect potential attacks on the bus. These two works lay the foundation for a myriad of literature on the authentication-based and intrusion-detection-based security measures in the following years.
Besides the two classes of active research, there is a great need for a third class of research that surveys existing works on automotive security and provides insights. To the best of our knowledge, the literature contains only a handful of papers [23] , [47] , [30] , [1] that provide a overview, albeit not extensively, of security threats to the CAN bus and countermeasures to protect against them. In [23] , the authors survey and identify the underlying security problems of the in-vehicle network. They further review architectural security features proposed by other researchers and discuss the deployment of honeypots and intrusion detection systems that constitute proposed security measures against potential attacks. Similarly, the authors of [47] survey some of the common attack vectors, both local and remote, and discuss external and internal protection measures to secure the vehicular communication bus. Likewise, in [30] , the authors discuss a wide class of remote attack surfaces and vulnerable cyber-physical systems and share their insights on measures that can be taken to protect against remote attacks. Similarly, the authors of [1] explore the security limitations of CAN bus and cover some security measures that researchers have proposed over the years. They also look into some potential attack scenarios and provide the CERT classification of these attack scenarios.
In this paper, we take an extensive approach into surveying intra-vehicular security, particularly focusing on the CAN bus communication. We start off by reviewing some common attack surfaces that researchers have practically exploited to gain access to the CAN bus. Next, we look into safety-critical functionalities that can be controlled once the internal network is accessed. We then look into security measures proposed by researchers over the years and discuss their limitations. Next, we share our observation of an efficient, cost-effective and incrementally deployable security solution for the CAN bus and cover its fundamentals. Finally, we discuss the subtle implications to the security of the observed solution when the judgment of a human driver is taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
II. BACKGROUND ON CAN
To understand vehicle security, it is necessary to first gain a basic understanding of the controller area network (CAN) and the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate over the CAN bus. This section will detail CAN operation and provide a context for ECUs.
A. CAN Frames
CAN connects nodes along a bus that is broadcast in nature, meaning each message is sent to every node on the bus. Messages do not have a return address. Instead, nodes interpret whether a message is intended for them based on metadata describing what type of data the message holds. A CAN frame can be one of four types: a data frame, remote frame, an error frame, or an overload frame. A data frame contains data that is to be interpreted or processed by the receiver. A remote frame is used to request transmission of a specific message. An error frame, which starts with a 6-bit error flag, is used to indicate an error has occurred, and an overload frame is used to add a delay between frames [6] . Data frames are most relevant from the vehicular security point of view and can be seen below in Figure 1 . Table I provides descriptions and bit lengths for each field within a CAN data frame. A data frame has the capability of carrying up to 8 bytes of data, but this is not required. The exact length of the data field is given in the DLC. Additionally, a 1-byte checksum is typically contained in the last byte of the data field to ensure integrity. This checksum is not part of the CAN protocol, but it is implemented by most vehicle manufacturers for added security [6] . The identifier field is perhaps the most important field in a frame besides the data field itself. As was mentioned earlier, CAN frames are broadcast to every node on the network. Frames also do not contain a transmitter or receiver address. Instead, nodes use the identifier field to determine if a frame is useful to them. Using a vehicle example, a frame containing speed data would have a unique identifier that is used every time any frame containing speed data is transmitted over the network, regardless of the sender. The base frame format allows for an 11-bit identifier while the extended frame format allows for a second identifier field containing another 18 bits of identifier data, resulting in a 29-bit identifier. A frame will contain an extended identifier only if the Identifier Extension bit is recessive.
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B. CAN Access Contention
The identifier field also contains data regarding the priority of a frame. The priority of a frame is used to resolve conflict between two nodes attempting to transmit data over the CAN simultaneously. Once the CAN bus is idle, a node may immediately issue a frame for transmittal. It is possible that another node was waiting for the idle state of the bus and it also issues a frame for transmittal simultaneously with the other node. In this situation, the CAN protocol resolves the issue using an arbitration process based on priority in which the node that transmitted the frame with the lowest identifier value receives access to the bus. To determine this, the contending nodes send their frames one bit at a time and monitor the output of the bus. The CAN bus acts as a logical AND gate in this situation, ANDing the bits from each frame. If a node observes a dominant (0) bit where it sent a recessive (1) bit, it has lost the arbitration process and the other competing node is given access to the CAN bus. The winner can then broadcast its message over the CAN and the loser is put back in receiving mode where it waits to transmit its message until the CAN is detected idle again. Once the arbitration winner is finished transmitting its message, there is a 3-bit buffer and then the CAN bus is again open for access -the node that lost the original arbitration process may now again attempt to broadcast its message. This protocol ensure that frames with higher priority are always given first access to the CAN bus [6] , [40] .
C. CAN Error Handling
Most electronic communication is subject to bit errors, CAN included. The purpose of the error handling protocol is not only to detect errors, but also to ensure proper functionality of the network in the presence of errors, which is vitally important in a safety-critical vehicular network. Each node along the CAN monitors the frames being transmitted and attempts to detect errors. Each node also contains two counters, one for transmittal errors and one for receipt errors, that are incremented when a transmitter detects a fault in its own message or a listening node detects a fault in an observed node, respectively. The CAN protocol includes at least five methods for error detection [26] :
Bit Monitoring: When a node transmits a message over the CAN bus, it also monitors the output of the bus. If the observed output of the bus is different than the message that was transmitted, then a bit error is issued. This, however, does not occur during the arbitration phase that takes place during CAN access contention.
Bit Stuffing: When a node transmits five consecutive bits of the same value, it will add a sixth bit of the opposite value to the sequence. Receiver nodes will then remove this bit upon receipt. If a receiver reads a frame with five consecutive bits of same value and the sixth bit of opposite value is not present, then the receiver issues a stuff error.
Frame Check: The CAN standard fixes certain parts of each frame to specific values. These areas are the CRC delimiter, the ACK delimiter, End of Frame, and the intermission between frames. If a node on the CAN observes one of these areas to disagree with the standard, it issues a form error. it or not. The transmitter sends a recessive bit in this field when the message is sent. If the transmitter does not observe a dominant bit in the ACK slot, it issues an acknowledgement error.
Cyclic Redundancy Check: Each frame contains a 15bit Cyclic Redundancy Check. If a receiver observes a different CRC than what it calculates itself, it issues a CRC Error.
D. CAN Error Confinement
If a node on the bus detects an error using one of the checking mechanisms outlined in the previous subsection, it will transmit an error frame consisting of an error flag. Other nodes will then detect the error flag and discard the current broadcast message. Every node on the network maintains two counters: a Transmit Error Counter (TEC) and a Receive Error Counter (REC) [26] .
There are three states that a node can exist in: Error Active, Error Passive, and Bus Off. A node is in the Error Active state by default in which it will transmit an active error frame (with an active error flag) each time an error is detected and then proceed to re-transmit the message. When errors are detected by a transmitter its TEC is incremented by 8. When a receiver detects an error its REC is incremented by 1. Thus, the TEC is typically incremented at a faster rate than the REC because the transmitter is often the source of the error. With each successfully transmitted message, both error counters are decremented. If either of a node's error counter exceed 127, that node will enter the Error Passive state in which it will transmit a passive error frame (with a passive error flag) if an error is detected. Unlike the active error flag which consists of 6 dominant bits, the passive error flag consists of 6 recessive bits and therefore, does not interfere with the bus traffic. The error counters of an Error Passive node proceed to increment at normal rates. If either counter value is incremented past 255, the node will enter a Bus Off state in which it will not transmit anything whatsoever over the bus [26] .
E. Electronic Control Units
A modern vehicle is comprised of many embedded components controlling various vehicle functionalities. These components are known as Electronic Control Units (ECUs). ECUs can control trivial tasks such as opening windows and unlocking doors or more complicated tasks that are vital to vehicle functionality such as anti-lock braking systems and collision prevention systems [36] .
The ECUs make up the nodes of a vehicle's communication network. ECUs may be present on multiple networks such as Local Interconnect network (LIN), Media-oriented Systems Transport (MOST), or the CAN [36] . This paper will only focus on CAN traffic. Every ECU on the bus is connected to every other ECU and due to the broadcast nature of the CAN, every ECU sees every message that is broadcast. To determine whether a message is intended for it, an ECU will look at the identifier of every message and interpret the meta-data to determine if the contents of the message pertain to it. Most vehicles contain a high speed bus for critical functions and a low speed bus for non-critical functions. Additionally, there may be bridge nodes connecting the high and low speed bus, making it possible for every ECU on the network to communicate with every other node. A modern vehicle may contain over 80 ECUs connected over its network. Common ECUs present in modern vehicles are compiled in table II 1 [31] , [29] , [44] , [8] , [37] . Similarly table III shows typical data produced and consumed by some of the major ECUs on the bus. This provides a good context for understanding the different types of ECUs present on the CAN network and the types of data they produce and consume on the bus.
III. ATTACK SURFACES AND EXPLOITS
In this section, we look into the contemporary state of vehicular security by providing a brief overview on vehicular attack surfaces and reviewing the existing works related to vehicular attacks. We briefly look into attacks that are not CAN-focused, then move on to attacks that are focused on gaining access to the CAN bus. Under attacks that are CAN-focused, there are two ways to gain access to the bus: physical access and remote access. We briefly cover common attack surfaces that allow these types of accesses. We note that attacks requiring physical access are often impractical as the methods for conducting those attacks are less realistic for malicious purposes than for remote attacks.
The first step in arbitrarily altering a vehicle's behavior is to get malicious code running on a particular component. This can be accomplished through gaining access to a particular component of the vehicle, typically an ECU 1 Pertaining to the fact that vehicle manufacturers have tendency to name a similarly functioning ECU differently from other manufacturers, the list may contain redundancies. 2 connected to the CAN, via physical or wireless channels. As we will see, the range of physical and wireless access can vary based on the attack.
A. Non-CAN Attacks 1) Tire Pressure Monitoring System: The purpose of a Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) is to continuously monitor the air pressure of a vehicle's tires and alert the operator if a substantially dip in pressure is detected. The TPMS consists of sensors inside each tire to monitor the pressure as well as an ECU responsible for communicating with the sensors and alerting the vehicle operator of an under-inflated tire by sending messages over the CAN to a central vehicle computer, typically a TCM [20] . A wired connection from the [20] used reverse engineering tactics in order to discover the proprietary information behind the wireless communication such as the modulation and encoding schemes and the message formats, the details of which are documented in the referenced work. After learning the necessary protocols, they were able to receive and spoof TPMS messages at ranges up to 40m using a cheap antenna and basic low noise amplifier. It is assumed this range could be increased using improved equipment. This attack does, however, only give limited access to the CAN. The publishers of the attack were not able to gain unauthorized access to the TPMS ECU but were instead able to spoof messages to the ECU causing it to alert the driver of low tire pressure despite the pressure being adequate. While this is not necessarily a direct risk to the driver and passenger safety, it poses concerns as to the possibilities of further malicious intent based on a driver's reaction to these messages.
2) KeeLoq Cipher: KeeLoq is a block cipher with 32-bit blocks that is widely used in remote keylessentry systems despite its short, 64-bit key size. There are numerous attacks on the cipher employing methods such as the slide, guess and determine, fixed points, and algebraic techniques [7] , [4] , [3] . The authors of [19] were able to craft a more efficient attack based on the slide technique combined with a novel meet-in-themiddle attack. The optimized version of the attack uses 2 16 known plaintexts with a time complexity of 2 44.5 KeeLoq encryptions (528 rounds). The total run-time for the attack is 500 days and can be parallelized across x CPUs for an effective run-time of 500/x days.
B. CAN Attacks
1) Media player: The authors of [5] identified two vulnerabilities within the media player. First, the player has an update capability that automatically recognizes a CD formatted to the ISO 9660 standard that contains a specifically named file. The system then displays a message on the display and if the user does not respond with the correct input, the media player firmware will be re-flashed with the data on the CD.
Second, knowing that the media player must be capable of parsing audio files, after reverse-engineering the firmware, they located a file reading function that makes strong assumptions about the length of the input. They also discovered the parser for a particular type of audio file (WMA extension for Windows Media Player audio files) allows for arbitrary length reads. Together these two discoveries allow for a buffer overflow attack. The attack is difficult to execute however. The buffer to overflow is not on the stack, but is instead in the BSS (Basic Service Set) segment [5] . This complicates the attack because there are no clear control variables to overwrite in the BSS segment and immediately following the segment there are state variables that are checked frequently. Arbitrarily overwriting these would crash the system. To execute this attack, the authors developed a debugger that communicates over an unused serial port on the media player. The debugger can then be used to analyze system memory and identify function pointers to overwrite. Finally, they modified a WMA file that exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability and allows CAN packets to be sent across the bus. This audio file could be burned to a CD and inserted into the player or the file could be on a separate device such as a cell phone that is then connected to the media player via USB.
2) OBD-II: The on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) port is used by technicians when servicing a vehicle and, for this reason, it has access to all CAN buses within a vehicle. All vehicles in the U.S. are required to support the PassThru standard [5] . This is a Windows based API that provides a software interface to communicate with a vehicle's internal networks and is typically implemented through having a PassThru device that connects directly to a vehicle's OBD-II port. A laptop used by the service technician is then able to connect, wired or wireless, to the device. The laptop has a Windows library installed that allows it to communicate with the vehicle's CAN bus via the PassThru device. The authors of [5] identified the most commonly used PassThru device for their particular vehicle but do not disclose the manufacturer. The device is network compatible and they were able to identify two vulnerabilities for the device. First, anyone on the same network can connect to the device with ease. This means if an attacker can gain access to a dealership or service center's private network, through any method of their choosing, they are able to connect to the device and communicate directly with the CAN. Second, they discovered it possible to compromise the PassThru device itself. If an attacker is able to compromise the device itself and install malware, they would then be able to affect any car the affected PassThru device connects to.
When the PassThru device boots, it broadcasts its IP address and TCP port for receiving client requests. The connection between the device and a client device is unauthenticated so gaining access to the network is the only deterrent. The authors of [5] discovered an input validation bug within the implementation of an API protocol designed for network configuration that allows an attacker to run shell scripts on the device. Thus, in order to carry out this attack, an attacker could create a program that contacts to a PassThru device that is broadcasting its network information, exploit the input validation bug to execute arbitrary shell commands, and install malicious files that are designed to send pre-programmed CAN messages to whatever vehicle the PassThru device is connected to. Presumably, the message would contain data to install malware onto the vehicle's telematics unit. The attacker could also modify the program to make it a worm that spreads to other PassThru devices on the network after infecting one. Thus, an attacker could potentially install malware on hundreds of vehicles at a dealership/service center with their only major roadblock being gaining access to the private network.
In addition to a PassThru device, an ECOM device can also be used to interface with the OBD-II port and read and write to the CAN bus, albeit an adapter may be required for connector compatibility. The authors of [29] customized an ECOM cable to interface with the OBD-II port and gain access to the internal network. They used the accompanying ECOM API to inject both normal and diagnostic CAN packets and control various vehicle functionalities including, but not limited to, the steering, brakes, speedometer readings, lights and horns. Further, they were also able to perform denial of service attacks to limit vehicle functionalites such as the steering.
Clearly, an OBD-II port is a convenient means to gain access to the CAN bus and inject CAN packets. Although researchers often use it to demonstrate the wide range of possibilities of controlling various vehicle functionalities via carefully crafted CAN messages, the OBD-II port in itself is an inexpedient attack vector to an outside attacker. However, it can be an interesting attack vector to an inside attacker with a potentially different objective, such as altering odometer readings or even reverse engineering proprietary ECU firmwares.
3) Bluetooth: Most modern vehicles are equipped with Bluetooth functionality for hands-free calling, media, etc. which is typically found in the telematics module. The authors of [5] were able to reverse engineer the program responsible for handling Bluetooth functionality of a test vehicle. Inside the program, they found an easily exploitable call to strcpy that creates an easy buffer overflow opportunity for any paired device. Additionally, rather than pairing her own device, an attacker could instead compromise a different device that is already paired with a vehicle. To demonstrate this, the authors create a Trojan Horse program that monitors Bluetooth connections on an Android phone and, if the connecting device is a telematics module, executes the buffer overflow attack and sends a malicious payload to the vehicle.
Attacks leveraging Bluetooth capabilities are not limited to already paired devices, however. The authors of [5] were also able to sniff the Bluetooth MAC address of the vehicle using Bluesniff [46] which required a previously paired device be present in the vehicle. Further, as the bluetooth unit of the test vehicle did not require any user interaction for pairing, they were able to brute-force the PIN and pair a new bluetooth device. However, the authors note that the rate at which PINs can be tested and the total time for a successful brute-force entirely depends on the response time of the vehicle's Bluetooth stack.
4) Telematics Control Module (TCM):
Long-range wireless access can commonly be associated with the telematics module and its cellular network capabilities. Modern vehicles are equipped with cell-phone interfaces typically containing a voice channel for phone calls, an SMS channel for text message, and a data channel for navigation purposes [5] . This section will focus on the voice channel. All cellular data is routed through a Telematics Call Center (TCC) that is operated by the vehicle manufacturer. Normally, when a call is made to the vehicle, the vehicle will first send a random, three byte challenge packet to the TCC and an authentication timer is started. The TCC then hashes the challenge with an 8-byte pre-shared key to generate a response to the challenge that must be received by the vehicle within 12 seconds of the challenge packet being sent. If the time limit is exceeded or the challenge response is incorrect, the vehicle sends an error packet and ends the attempted connection.
Through rigorous reverse-engineering tactics, the authors of [5] were able to create an artificial TCC through which they were able to communicate with a vehicle, sending arbitrary cellular data packets. Two vulnerabilities within the authentication protocol were discovered that can be compounded with a separate vulnerability within the interface to the TCC. First, the implementation of the random challenge is hardly random. The key is generated by performing a certain algorithm on a seed. However, the seed is static and the random challenge generator is reset whenever the telematics unit starts. This means the random key is the same every time the telematics unit starts, allowing an attacker to easily au-thenticate with the vehicle. Second, the code tasked with parsing the authentication challenge request responses contains an error that authenticates incorrect responses. For carefully formatted incorrect responses, roughly 1 out of every 256 will be interpreted as correct as a result of this error. This is the case as long as the random key generator is not reinitialized, starting back over with the seed mentioned above. This means that this error will occur as long as the vehicle remains on when the incorrect responses are sent.
The interface to the TCC assumes that incoming packets will not exceed 100 bytes. Thus, input lengths are not checked, allowing for a buffer overflow. The payload created by the authors of [5] to mount this overflow attack was over 300 bytes. However, the interface to the TCC only allows for a 21 bytes per second throughput. Given the 12 second limit for a response to the authentication challenge, this vulnerability alone is not sufficient in gaining access to the telematics module. Instead the vulnerability in the authentication protocol must be exploited first. After authentication, the timeout window is changed from 12 seconds to 60 seconds, allowing enough time for the buffer overflow attack to be executed. Only after combining these two attacks can an attacker execute malicious code on the TCM.
The authors of the aforementioned paper make a note that the previously mentioned attacks were performed on vehicles whose manufacturer and make were undisclosed. Thus, the detailed attacks may be very difficult to replicate. However, [31] documents an entire remote exploit chain and discloses the target vehicle, a 2014 Jeep Cherokee, as well as the specific hardware components of the vehicle that were used in the exploit. Again, the exploit relies on the telematics module of the vehicle and its cellular network capabilities. The telematics module contains a D-Bus message daemon that is used for interprocess communication and, using the appropriate D-Bus service, code can be run using the D-Bus's execute method. The authors state that the easiest step from here is to start an SSH service in order to run commands from a remote terminal [31] . This will allow an attacker to control radio, HVAC, and other non-CAN related functions that are associated with the telematics module. In order to inject CAN packets and increase the scope of the attack, further steps must be taken.
The telematics module is able to communicate over the CAN using a V850 chip with an OMAP chip acting as an intermediary between the telematics module's D-Bus service and the V850. Thus, compromising the V850 chip could provide an attacker with CAN access. To do this, the authors used reverse engineering tactics to locate the file responsible for updating the V850. Carefully modifying this file in order for the V850 to still accept it as an update file allows the attacker to flash the V850 with the modified firmware, which can be utilized to send arbitrary CAN messages over the network [31] .
The authors of [12] looked into an aftermarket telematics control module that has a standard OBD-II port interface to connect to a vehicle. The authors found that a remote attacker can discover and compromise these devices to take remote control of the vehicle. The reference TCM that was exploited is one manufactured by Mobile Devices Ingenierie and commonly used for insurance purposes. It includes a mini-USB connector which provides debugging capability and emulates a network adapter. When debugging is enabled, a web server and telnet console listen on ports 80 and 23 respectively. However, both these services were found to not require any form of authentication. On a more serious security issue, anyone with physical access to the system (and some expertise) could remove the NAND flash chip to read and modify its contents. The authors were able to extract cryptographic keys and certificates from the NAND dump and use it to access the SSH service running on the device. Using the key, they were able to authenticate to the device and read and write files, execute commands and install software to modify functionality. The authors of [12] also found that that the manufacturer of the TCM used the same SSH key on several of their other TCM devices. Moreover, the same SSH key could be used to login to the TCM over the web if the IP address was known. The authors point out that Network Address Translation used by some cellular carriers seem to make this task more difficult. However, they note that that this is dependent on the carrier and some cellular provider allow direct addressing. The TCM also exposed an SMS-based interface which supported the same sets of commands as those by the local debug interface.
C. Attack Outcomes
Thus far we have discussed multiple methods for gaining access to the internal vehicular network. Next, we look into what can be done once an attacker gains unauthorized access to the network. In what follows, we look into documented attacks and the outcomes of such attacks from the safety point of view. We make a note that although the attacks were performed on specific vehicle models, similar attacks are possible on myriad of other vehicle makes and models. Also, we expect the outcomes of such attacks to be similar in scope and severity across all vehicles.
1) Control Over Braking:
The authors of [29] experimented on a Toyota Prius that came equipped with a Pre-Collision System (PCS) that is designed to aid the driver in the event of an impending collision. One functionality of the PCS is to slow the vehicle down when it is approaching a vehicle ahead of it that is traveling at a slower speed than itself, to avoid a collision. Through reverse engineering, [29] was able to identify the packet broadcast over the CAN that is responsible for this functionality. By replicating this packet, they were able to completely stop the vehicle, even if the accelerator pedal is completely depressed. The one caveat for this method is the packets for this functionality contain an embedded counter that is checked each time the packet is received. If this counter is not incremented properly, the packet is ignored. Thus, the attacker must continuously send the packet while incrementing the counter in order for the attack to work properly. This means that it is not possible to bring the vehicle to an abrupt stop. However, it may still be abrupt enough to cause serious damage in certain circumstances such as the case that a vehicle is approaching rapidly from the rear.
In addition to normal CAN packets that are constantly broadcast over the bus in order for ECUs to communicate with one another, diagnostic packets also exist. These packets are used by service technicians when performing diagnostic checks. These are typically sent over the OBD-II port but can also be replicated in the same way that normal packets can. As shown in [29] , it takes just one of these packets to engage the brakes in the Ford Focus. The packet specifies how much the brakes should be applied so it is possible to engage them completely. However, this packet will only be accepted while the vehicle is already stopped. Pressing the accelerator after this packet has been sent will fail to move the vehicle. An attacker could also, in principle, broadcast a false speed reading indicating that the vehicle is not moving in order to engage the brakes while moving.
Another similar diagnostic packet exists for the Ford Focus that is designed to bleed the brakes [29] . While the brakes are being bled, the brake pedal physically cannot be depressed. This packet is only interpreted as valid when the vehicle is traveling at speeds less than 5 mph. Issuing this packet while a vehicle is parking near a building or driving in stop-and-go traffic could potentially cause moderate damage. However, as false speed packets were sent while abusing the IPAS system in the Toyota Prius, it could be assumed that false speed packets could also be generated in this situation, causing the brakes to not function at arbitrary speeds.
2) Control Over Steering: The authors of [29] were also able to exploit the Intelligent Park Assist System (IPAS) of the Toyota Prius that is designed to assist the driver when attempting to parallel park or back into a parking space. IPAS is an interesting attack surface because this system controls the steering of the vehicle electronically. However, the steering functionality only works when the vehicle is in reverse and travelling under 4 mph; neither of these conditions allow an attacker to pose any real threat. Thus, in order to execute this attack, the attacker must send false speed packets indicating that the vehicle is traveling less than 4 mph and send false packets indicating that the vehicle is in reverse. After taking care of these two issues, an attacker can then replicate messages from the IPAS to the servo mechanism, the mechanism that moves the steering wheel on behalf of an ECU to steer the vehicle in an arbitrary way while the vehicle is operating in drive at any speed. Steering directions from the IPAS only allow for short, jerky movement which would not suffice for complete remote control, but would definitely be enough control to cause the vehicle to crash at high speeds.
The Prius also comes equipped with a Lane Keep Assist (LKA) feature that is designed to detect when a vehicle begins to veer out of is lane and correct the path accordingly. Contrary to the IPAS, this feature is designed to work at arbitrary speeds while the vehicle is in drive. Thus, replicating the packets sent from the LKA module will be able to control steering. However, the system is designed to ignore packets requesting the wheel to turn more than five degrees. This should still be enough to cause damage to a vehicle traveling at a high speed on a crowded or very small street.
Besides replicating CAN packets, an attacker can also flood the CAN causing a denial of service on the CAN bus. This means that no packets can be delivered over the CAN bus. Different ECUs react differently when this happens, but the Power Steering Control Module (PSCM) in the Ford Focus shuts down completely, causing it to no longer provide the driver with assistance while steering. This makes it difficult for the driver to turn the wheel and does not allow the driver to turn it more than 4 degrees, regardless of how much force they put in. In order to cause the denial of service, an attacker must simply continuously send CAN packets with the lowest possible identifier, all dominant bits. Due to the access contention aspect of the CAN protocol documented in the preceding sections, no real CAN packets will ever be processed as nothing has higher priority than an identifier containing all recessive bits. It should also be noted that continuously playing this packet before the vehicle is started will not allow the vehicle to start.
3) Control Over Throttle: In [29] , by injecting malicious CAN packets, the authors were also able to control the throttle of the Toyota Prius, albeit momentarily. For this particular vehicle, the authors mention that there are a couple of preconditions to being able to control the acceleration by injecting CAN packets: first, the CAN packets for acceleration must be directly replayed from the Power Management ECU, the Engine Control Module or the bridge connecting the two as it is not visible from the standard OBD-II port, and second, for the injected packets to have any impact on the acceleration, the Internal Combustion engine must be engaged and then disengaged. Also, attributing to the fact that the Prius is a hybrid vehicle, the Internal Combustion Engine is not always in charge of the acceleration and therefore, forged packets to control the acceleration cannot always be deemed reliable. However, note that even a momentary, one-off acceleration is often enough to cause serious accidents, either directly or indirectly (for instance, by eliciting an impulsive action from the driver).
4) Denial of Service:
The authors of [6] discuss a Denial-of-Service attack which exploits the errorhandling scheme of in-vehicle networks to shut-down the healthy ECUs. They exploit the CAN's error handling mechanism for this attack: by repeatedly injecting attack messages to increase the TEC of a healthy ECU, they trick the CAN fault confinement mechanism into thinking that the ECU is faulty and therefore, force it to shut down. When an attack message is transmitted with the same ID and at the same time as the actual message from the victim ECU but with at least one dominant bit (0) as opposed to the recessive bit (1) in the corresponding position(s) of the other message, the victim ECU experiences a bit error and thus, fooled into increasing its TEC by 8. By repeatedly injecting such messages, the TEC of the victim ECU increases past 255, and therefore, the victim ECU is forced to enter bus-off mode where it disconnects from the bus. The success of this technique is further enhanced by the fact that upon detection of an error, the TEC increases by 8 while for each error-free transmission, it only decreases by 1.
D. Vulnerability Assessment
Assessing vulnerability is an important task in identifying critical security pitfalls and understanding associated risk levels. In this section, we overview existing works that propose a systematic approach to assess the vulnerabilities of various automotive attack surfaces. We also look into methods and metrics that are clearly defined to capture the vulnerability assessment process and the output of such process.
In [43] , the authors propose a quantitative method for vulnerability assessment of automotive ECUs. Their approach involves four steps to the vulnerability assessment process: Attack Surface Collection, Vulnerability Prediction, Vulnerability Finding Effort and Exploit Creation Effort. The authors define the Attack Surface as the collection of all interaction opportunities with an ECU which includes, but is not limited to, incoming data at an ECU, third-party apps, reflash routines and hardware attack surface spots. Next, the vulnerability of a surface is estimated using the vulnerability density which is defined as the ratio of security relevant defects to the ECU code size. The vulnerability density can also be approximated from a software's defect density. Similarly, the vulnerability finding effort is defined as the initial setup effort summed with all individual attack surface probing efforts. It can also be estimated as the product of the expected number of vulnerability finding tries and the average vulnerability finding effort. Likewise, the exploit creation effort is defined as the sum of the expected access effort, the expected basic exploitation effort and the expected counter exploit mitigation effort. Lastly, the expected ECU exploitation value is defined as the sum of expected vulnerability finding effort and the expected exploit creation effort.
IV. MITIGATIONS AND SECURITY MEASURES
In this section, we take a look into different security measures that are being proposed in order to overcome some of the security limitations of CAN. Here, we categorize the security measures broadly based on the underlying security principles they follow.
A. Security based on authentication
In existing literature, numerous security measures that use some form of authentication have been proposed. The authors of [35] propose a delayed message authentication based on compound message authentication codes. The proposed scheme compounds every four messages sent from an ECU to another ECU and calculates a MAC for the compounded message. The MAC is then split into chunks of four and sent with subsequent four messages. The receiver, therefore, requires 4 subsequent messages to verify the authenticity of the 4 preceding messages, hence the authentication is delayed. The algorithm used to calculate the MAC is the 3GPP encryption algorithm, KASUMI, used in Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code mode.
In [51] , the authors propose CANAuth, a backward compatible message authentication protocol for the CAN bus. It utilizes out-of-band transmission through the use of the CAN+ protocol [55] to perform authentication, which allows for a maximum of 15 bytes for an authentication message. Authentication under CANAuth is a two-step process, starting with key establishment followed by authentication. Key establishment requires that each node on the bus has access to one or more preshared keys, one for each group of related messages, i.e. speed data messages, steering command messages, etc. The transmittal node can now begin the authentication process. The key establishment process is divided into two messages, the first of which is divided into three sections, 8 status bits, a 24-bit counter value, and an 88-bit random number. To begin key establishment, this message is broadcast and all nodes possessing the correct pre-shared key are able to generate a session key using the counter value and the random number using HMAC [2] with the pre-shared key. The counter value is in place to guard against replay attacks as each node stores the previously validated counter value and checks that the currently received value is in fact greater than the stored value.
Next, the transmittal node broadcasts a second message containing the 8 status bits along with a 112-bit signature comprised of a hash of the session key and the counter value. Now, all receiving nodes are able to validate that the transmittal node knows the session key and is trustworthy. Finally, authentication can take place. An authentication message again contains the 8 status bits, a new 32-bit counter value, and an 80-bit signature comprised of a hash of the session key and the new counter value. Again, before authenticating, receiving nodes must check the counter value to ensure that it is greater than the previously stored value.
Another authentication protocol for CAN is proposed in [15] . The proposed protocol is a lightweight broadcast authentication protocol called LiBrA-CAN. LiBrA-CAN was designed to address the shortcomings of CANAuth, for instance, the impracticality of storing a key for each CAN ID, and uses a progressive authentication mechanism based on key splitting and MAC mixing paradigms. MAC mixing allows for the integration of multiple authentication codes while key splitting increase the entropy of each mixed MAC. The Linearly Mixed MACs increase the security as one wrong MAC corrupts all other MACs and thus the verification of the mixed MAC will fail on each of the associated keys.
The scheme basically uses a centralized authentication setup consisting of a master node and slave nodes connected to the CAN bus. All slave nodes register to the master node as a part of the key sharing process and the master node distributes the keys. Multiple tags, generated by a tag generation algorithm are concatenated to build the Mixed MAC. The tag verification algorithm outputs 1 if and only if the tag is valid, else it outputs 0. When the master receives a data frame containing a message from a slave, it checks if the counter integrated in the data frame is up to date and queues the message for authentication. Then, when it receives an authentication frame containing a tag from the slave, it takes the matching packet off the queue and authenticates it. If the authentication is successful, it then authenticates the tag to other nodes.
Likewise, in [14] , the authors formulate a security mechanism based on Trusted Communication Group to enable authenticity and confidentiality in the CAN bus. The concept revolves around the notion of a "Super-Gateway", otherwise known as a Key Distribution Centre (KDC), that generates and transmits group keys to ECUs in each communication group. The protocol uses asymmetric key cryptography for the key distribution phase and symmetric key cryptography to encrypt subsequent CAN messages. Each ECU stores its private key in a tamper-proof memory while the public key of the KDC is made available to all the ECUs. The membership of the group is defined using the ECU's Access Control List (ACL) which is cryptographically signed by the vehicle manufacturer to provide for its integrity. Each ECU can only transmit messages to other ECUs in its group and since the traffic is encrypted, the protocol achieves both authenticity and confidentiality.
In [9] , the authors propose an authentication scheme and analyze its safety-security trade-off. The proposed scheme computes an integrity tag for a given message by hashing the message with an authentication key. The integrity tag is then concatenated with the message and encrypted with an encryption key. In a nutshell, it uses the MAC-then encrypt approach to ensure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of CAN messages. The authors also compare the safety and security properties of other schemes for message protection, namely EN C +CRC, plain+M AC and plain+CRC, against the proposed EN C +M AC scheme. They conclude that although Encryption has a stronger security property, it directly influences the probability of residual error and therefore, has a weaker safety property.
Another authentication framework, VeCure, is proposed in [53] and is based on a concept of a trust group. Basically, each ECU is assigned a trust level based on how easy of a target the ECU is for an attacker. Based on the trust levels, ECUs are then grouped into different trust groups. While the high-trust group nodes are able to compute authentication codes and therefore, share a secret symmetric key, the low-trust groups are not provisioned with this capability. In the initialization phase, each ECU is assigned a unique 1 byte node ID which is used in the generation and verification of authentication codes. The node IDs along with the symmetric key are stored in the flash memory of each ECU in the high trust group.
Each data message from the high-trust group is followed by an authentication message that embeds the authentication information. Two bytes of authentication message are used for the message counter. The message counter together with a session number is used to protect against replay attacks. The session number is initialized for each driving session and stored on the ECU's flash memory. One-byte node ID, 4-byte message authentication code and 1-byte authentication marker make up the remaining bytes of the authentication message. The computation of the message authentication code is carried out in two phases: a heavyweight offline computation and a lightweight online computation. The offline computation is carried out in advance and involves computing a hash from the node ID, the session number, the overflow counter, the message counter and the symmetric key, but not the data. The data goes as a parameter to the online computation along with the hash to compute the final MAC.
In a more recent work, Kurachi et al. have proposed a centralized authentication system for the CAN bus, CaCAN [25] . CaCAN introduces the concept of a monitor node, a node tasked with authenticating other nodes on the bus. The monitor node and each ECU share cryptographic keys which are used for computing the message authentication code. The authorization keys are stored in an anti-tamper memory of the monitor node. This centralized authentication system requires a hardware modification to the CAN bus as the monitor node requires a special CAN controller, HMAC-CAN. In this system, every data frame sent on the bus has a MAC that is checked by the HMAC-CAN controller.
If the HMAC-CAN controller detects an unauthorized message, it overwrites the unauthorized data frame with an error frame in real time to destroy the unauthorized message and eliminate its unwanted effects.
Another centralized authentication system similar to
CaCan is proposed in [50] . The proposed system consists of a special purpose monitor node that is tasked with the authentication of each ECU. In a nutshell, each transmitting node calculates the MAC, attaches a part of the MAC to the payload and transmits the frame. The monitor node then verifies the MAC and upon mismatch, it overwrites the message with an error frame. The system is, however, different from CaCan in other aspects. For instance, it uses mutual authentication scheme where the monitor node verifies a part of the digest and the transmitting node verifies the remaining part of the digest. A random seed, generated by the monitoring node and sent to the transmission node, is used to generate the digest.
Similarly, in [42] , the authors propose LeiA, a fully backwards compatible authentication protocol for the CAN bus. In this protocol, each participant stores a tuple consisting of the CAN ID, a 128-bit long-term symmetric key used to derive the session key, a 56-bit epoch that contributes in the generation of the session key, a 128-bit session key used to generate the MAC and a 16-bit counter value embedded in the MAC and sent with the messages. The sender and the receiver first generate the session keys using the long-term key and the epoch. The epoch is incremented each time before a session key is generated and the counter is set to zero after the generation of a session key. Before sending an authenticated message, the sender updates the counter and if required, the epoch. The sender then computes the MAC with the session key, the counter and the data and then transmits the counter, the data and MAC. After receiving these values, the receiver verifies the MAC. The protocol also allows for resynchronization if the MAC cannot be verified.
Another CAN authentication protocol is LCAP [16] , which is a lightweight protocol that relies on a use of a 2-byte magic number. The number is computed using the hash function used in the TESLA [41] protocol and appended to each message. To compute the magic number, the sender picks a random number and repeatedly applies a transformation function. The initial magic number of each message is broadcast to all receivers. As using the same magic number to authenticate all the messages from a sender leaves a big security hole, the protocol, instead, orders messages such that the first message can be verified by applying the hash-function once, the second message by applying the hash-function twice and so forth. The protocol also defines two modes of operation: Extended Mode and Standard Mode. In the Extended Mode, the Extended Identifier field of the CAN message is used to send the magic number whereas in the Standard Mode, the magic number is sent in the payload, thus consuming 2 bytes of the payload. To further increase the security, in the Standard Mode, the whole payload is encrypted using a symmetric key that is shared between the sender and the receiver. vatiCAN, another authentication mechanism for CAN, is proposed in [38] . Like many other authentication mechanisms discussed in this paper, vatiCAN uses a separate CAN message for authentication purposes. An authentication message with a different sender ID follows a critical message to be authenticated. However, unlike other similar mechanisms, only selected messages are authenticated, thereby significantly reducing the overhead of authentication. Also, only vatiCANaware recipients authenticate the critical message. As with other similar mechanisms, the execution of the corresponding command is deferred until the reception of the authentication message for the corresponding critical message. If the authentication fails, the message is discarded.
B. Security based on intrusion detection
Various authors have proposed different intrusion detection methods for CAN bus. In [18] , Hoppe et al. discuss intrusion detection techniques that can be used to detect potential attacks on the CAN bus. They discuss three detection patterns for this purpose: increased message frequency, obvious misuse of message-IDs, and low-level communication characteristics. The technique to detect attacks based on increased message frequency is based on the observation that many attacks involve repeatedly injecting packets to the CAN bus which results in higher than normal frequency of the corresponding packets. On the other hand, misuse of message-IDs refer to the fact that attackers often compromise a node (typically, an ECU) to inject packets that look like packets from some other nodes. As CAN is a broadcasting protocol, the sending node also receives the message. As such, a simple source ID functionality can be added to each node to check for whether the current message bearing a particular source ID was actually generated by the corresponding node for that ID. Lastly, detection patterns that involve low-level communication characteristics are based on observing electrical signals in the physical layer. When ECUs generate CAN mes-sages, the CAN controller generates electrical signals on the bus to broadcast the message. The signals generated can be specific to a message type and the source ECU which can be used to identify the sender of the message.
The authors of [13] propose an intrusion detection method that leverages on the fact that each ECU in the CAN bus sends its messages with a specific frequency. As such, the interval between subsequent messages for each ECU in the bus is constant. The proposed IDS checks the arrival time of each message and verifies its frequency. Since each message is associated with an ID, the frequency of an incoming message can be checked against the frequency of regular messages for that particular ID. If the arrival time of a message bearing an ID is less than the regular arrival time for that ID, it corresponds to an attack and therefore, the IDS issues an alert. Some other similar intrusion detection methods that use the frequency of CAN messages as a detection pattern include the works in [45] and [48] . The hybrid IDS proposed by the authors of [45] uses both attack signatures and anomaly in CAN traffic frequency to detect possible attacks. Basically, the IDS keeps a score of anomalies in message frequency and whenever the score hits a preset threshold, the event is identified as an attack. Similarly, the flow-based anomaly detection scheme discussed in [48] uses a sliding window approach that computes the flow of the CAN packets in the preset window and compares against a historical reference to detect anomalies. The authors also explore the effectiveness of the approach over a range of packet injection frequencies to determine its practical limitations. Further, the authors point out that, while the timing information can be reliably used to detect anomalous packets, the Hamming distance between successive packet data fields is not an apt measure for the same.
Recently, more concrete IDS models that use message frequency to detect intrusion have been developed. One such model with a very high true positive to false positive ratio is discussed in [32] . The model discussed observes the CAN data for a few seconds and records the timing information of CAN messages. It then uses this timing information against future observations to detect anomalies and potential attacks. The model also accounts for the possibility that even during normal events, CAN messages may be lost because of collisions. Hence, the observed timing information may be different from the recorded timing information. To reduce the number of false positives, the model requires that three consecutive anomalies be detected before an alert is issued.
An entropy-based anomaly detection approach that uses the measure of entropy to specify the normal behavior of the vehicular system and change in entropy as a potential attack is discussed in [33] . The scheme is based on the fact that automotive networks are restrictive in nature; each packet and its potential content is prespecified; the ID of a CAN message is correlated with the semantics of the payload; the frequencies of many messages are well defined and so forth. Put simply, the vehicular system contains a low entropy and attacks injecting new packets, manipulating the payloads or jamming packets, in general, increase the entropy.
Some researchers have also explored machine learning models that can be used to detect anomalies in the CAN bus. In [22] , the authors propose using a deep neural network (DNN) to detect attack packets. The DNN takes the data fields of CAN packets as inputs and outputs a binary label that identifies the packet as normal or malicious. Similarly, the authors of [28] use a machine learning model to detect deviations in CAN traffic. The proposed system uses a classifier to identify the field types of the CAN messages. Once the field types are identified, the messages are fit into a model similar to the Ternary Content-Addressable Memory model. A set of TCAMs is created for each message ID and all messages that meet the properties of that message ID'S fields are grouped in the same set. Any messages that do not fit into a set are considered an anomalous. Likewise, in [27] , the authors propose a similar anomaly detection algorithm based on the analysis of CAN messages. However, it does not require the knowledge of specification of CAN messages. The algorithm proceeds with its training phase by building a reference model based on the identification of recurring patterns in CAN message IDs during its normal operation. The observed transition between consecutive message IDs is captured in a data structure called the transition matrix. In the detection phase, the current sequence of message IDs is validated against the transition matrix. If two consecutive message IDs do not appear in the transition matrix, then the validation fails. On the other hand, if the two message IDs appear in the transition matrix but the transition is not marked, then the transition matrix is updated by marking the corresponding transition. This step essentially minimizes the number of false positives.
C. Limitations of existing security measures
The first step in finding a secure and efficient security solution for CAN is is to treat the problem at hand as a performance vs security vs cost trade-off problem. In other words, the solution should be cost-effective, meet the real-time communication needs of the vehicle and secure against potential cyber attacks. Although what constitutes acceptable performance and what constitutes acceptable security is not easily quantifiable, established standards from other domains can be adapted to quantify these metrics.
In addition to meeting the performance, security and cost needs, the proposed solution must also be scalable in that an increase in the number of ECUs should not significantly hinder the performance, impact security or increase cost. Further, it must also be ubiquitous and applicable to vehicles from all manufacturers following the CAN standard. And of course, while an improved standard is around the corner, the transitory solution must be backward-compatible with the current CAN specification.
Unfortunately, despite numerous security solutions for CAN being proposed over the years, barely any treat the problem as a trade-off or succeed in finding an acceptable range. All existing solutions have their limitations, and how well they hold up to the performance, security and cost needs of a vehicle is not readily understood. For instance, most of the authentication measures proposed in the existing literature require a second authentication packet that follows a data packet. Clearly, the authentication is delayed until the reception of this packet. This engenders latency in communication and impacts the real-time communication needs of the vehicle. Further, additional CAN messages for authentication increase the residual error rate [9] , [21] . Moreover, some authentication mechanisms need specialized central gateways which results in an increased cost of production. Similarly, anomaly detection based on frequency of CAN messages suffers from the problem that non-periodic packet types are not handled properly. Further, data-fields of packets are not examined, only the timing, which makes the solution much less robust. Similarly, most of the solutions that use machine learning to detect anomalies have questionable versatility. Further, how well all these solutions scale and whether they are ubiquitous for all manufacturers is not known.
Perhaps, the most significant limitation of the majority of proposed security measures is the vulnerability to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In [39] , the authors show that a carefully crafted Denial of Service attack can be mounted on the CAN bus even in the presence of intrusion detection systems that analyze CAN messages to detect potential attacks. We also expect authentication-based countermeasures to be ineffective against DoS attacks as they do not prevent an attacker from flooding the bus with a pool of CAN messages. This underlying shortcoming can be attributed to the fact that these countermeasures do not prevent an attacker from injecting messages to the bus, i.e. they do not prevent the production of CAN messages, rather, by design, they only prevent consumption and usage of maliciously injected messages.
V. AN EFFICIENT, COST-EFFECTIVE AND INCREMENTALLY DEPLOYABLE SOLUTION FOR CAN
A majority of known CAN attacks involve injecting packets to the CAN bus either locally or remotely. Therefore, it is only logical to look for a solution that involves filtering packets from unknown or compromised sources. However, CAN packets do not carry source information and therefore source-based filtering is not possible unless additional meta-data is incorporated into the payload itself, making firewall-like solutions inapplicable to CAN without significant adaptation.
Notably, the majority of packet injection attacks on CAN involve compromised ECUs mimicking some other ECUs in the network. It is rarely the case that ECUs that are directly responsible for an action such as controlling vehicular speed are compromised. Rather, an attacker compromises some other ECU and starts injecting packets to mimic one or more ECUs that are responsible for the action. For instance, in an adaptive cruise control mode, the Engine Control Module and the Adaptive Cruise Control System are two ECUs responsible for controlling vehicular speed. However, in none of the documented attacks, either of these ECUs is compromised. Rather, other ECUs such as the Telematics Control Module is compromised and packets are injected to mimic the Adaptive Cruise Control System. Clearly, if we could enforce a rule that the ECUs can only produce packets meeting some predetermined specifications, such mimicking behaviour can easily be counteracted. This observation immediately implies the need for a system that filters packets at the source ECU rather than the destination -a kind of reverse firewall, which, for lack of a better term, we decided to call icewall.
An icewall can be installed between an ECU and the CAN bus, filtering all outgoing ECU packets before they are transmitted. An example installation of multiple icewalls, where each icewall monitors an ECU that potentially exposes a remote interface, is shown in figure  2 . At its heart, an icewall monitors the corresponding ECU and ensures that all packets originating from the monitored ECU comply with preset rules regarding the content of the packet. All outgoing packets that do not meet its specifications are blocked and never make it to the bus, thereby eliminating any potential mimicking behavior. It should be noted that, by design, an icewall is supposed to let all incoming packets through.
Fig. 2: A potential icewall installation on a CAN network
An icewall is also resistant to many Denial of Service attacks. This is attributed to the fact that an icewall prevents compromised low priority ECUs from injecting high priority CAN messages and further, can be configured to limit the frequency of outgoing messages. With additional filter rules that disallow continuous injection of active error frames once the threshold (as defined in the standard) is hit, icewalls can be deployed as a viable solution to defend against the majority of Denial of Service attacks on the CAN bus.
A. Attacker Model
As an icewall is based on packet filtering, it can be effective against a class of false packet injection attacks. In our attacker model, we assume that an attacker is unable to compromise ECUs directly responsible for safetycritical actions (for instance, an Engine Control Module or an Adaptive Cruise Control System responsible for controlling the speed of a vehicle). This is a reasonable assumption as, to the best of our knowledge, all practical documented attacks involve remotely compromising a secondary ECU (or a set of ECUs) and injecting packets to mimic behavior of other ECUs [31] , [34] .
Next, we assume that the attacker has remote wireless access to the vehicle (and thus can interact with, and possibly compromise, any ECUs with wireless communication capabilities), and that the only direct physical access is limited to the OBD-II port. In this case, an icewall can be an effective defensive measure, primarily because it can be installed only where needed rather than at every ECU like a firewall. For instance, if we assume the attacker can only access a vehicle remotely, icewalls can be installed for all those ECUs that expose remote interfaces, as shown in Figure 2 . Similarly, if we assume the attacker can also inject packets through OBD-II port, the OBD-II port itself can be secured with an icewall.
A non-hardware-controlling adversary is a reasonable assumption in this case, since any attacker with direct access to the vehicle's components would be able to physically remove an icewall (or a firewall), or replace the entire ECU-icewall combination with a malicious device. Such an attacker may further reverse-engineer any ECU, or directly recover any secret keying material from the ECU's non-volatile memory or key-generation component, thus rendering most of the proposed defense mechanisms futile. Moreover, any potential defense mechanism that could deal with such an attacker would most likely be undesirable, as it would interfere with vehicle manufacturing, servicing and after-market customization.
B. Icewall Configuration
An icewall device can be installed as an OEM device or as an aftermarket equipment. Further, an icewall can be manually or automatically configured; the manual configuration of icewall requires preprogramming filter rules into an icewall device where modifying filter rules can only be done by the vehicle manufacturer or an authorized service personnel. Automatic configuration of an icewall can be achieved by enabling learning abilities into the icewall where it examines the first few incoming packets and sets a filtering rule that permits only those types of packets to enter the bus. An automatically configured icewall, in essence, is an Intrusion Detection System with machine learning abilities. Also, for automatic configuration purposes, an icewall device must come equipped with a reset button that allows it to flush its current filter rules and relearn new filter rules.
The automatic configuration of icewall does not come without its own problems, however. If an icewall is installed to monitor an ECU that sends multiple packet types, the installed icewall, in its learning phase, may be unable to learn all types of packets that should be allowed to enter the bus. All other packet types, even the legitimate ones, will therefore be blocked. In this case, for those ECUs, manual configuration of icewall is desirable. Automatic configuration of icewall does have its benefits, however. For one, icewall devices can be manufactured as universal plug-n-play devices. This clearly reduces the cost of a device as well as the effort required to set up the device.
C. Limitations and Enhancements
Unfortunately, icewall has its limitations. One such limitation is that it cannot prevent malicious packets that meet the preset rules from entering the bus. As discussed before, in a typical setting, this does not carry significant safety ramifications. However, in a setting where human judgment is taken into account, this limitation can have noteworthy implications. As an example, let us assume that an attacker has unrestricted access (for instance, by exploiting a vulnerability) to the Radio Module of a car-the Radio Module being monitored with an icewall. Despite the presence of an icewall, the attacker can still inject permissible packets. Assuming volume packets are permissible, the attacker can craft and inject false volume packets to suddenly turn up the volume. Such an action can often be enough to distract a driver and cause serious accidents, especially, while driving in high speed.
Human-in-the-Loop: To better elucidate the subtleties of a human involvement in vehicle control, we build an ECU Adjacency Graph 6 shown in Figure 3 . For simplicity, we omit information about the actual data that flow between ECUs. We can observe that there is no path of data flow from the Combination Meter Assembly to the ECM. Therefore, assuming that all ECUs are secured with icewalls, we do not see any obvious way for an attacker to control functionalities of the ECM (for instance, the acceleration) by compromising the Combination Meter Assembly. Unfortunately, with the introduction of a human driver in the control loop, the setting changes. With the human driver involved, it is now possible for the attacker to leverage on the driver's judgment to indirectly control the ECM functionalities. For instance, by displaying a false speedometer reading on the display, the attacker could motivate the human driver to accelerate or decelerate the car. Note that the attacker does not have to inject false speed packets to the bus (by mimicking the Adaptive Cruise Control, for instance), rather she only has to display a false reading on the dashboard. Although the Combination Meter Assembly is an unlikely attack vector, we stress that the concept holds true in general. In essence, with human involvement, the possibilities are unlimited.
Fig. 3: Adjacency graph reflecting the data flow (directed edges) between ECUs (nodes)
Various enhancements to an icewall are possible that not only limit potential damages in the aforementioned attack setting, but also makes an icewall more robust. One potential enhancement is to configure an icewall such that it not only examines the type of an outgoing packet but also its payload. This is particularly handy to detect abnormal readings in the packet data and block the packet. For instance, for regular cars, it is improbable that a car abruptly accelerates in a fraction of a second. Malicious speedometer display can therefore be potentially characterized by abnormal acceleration readings. By configuring icewall such that it blocks all packets with abnormal readings, it is therefore possible to limit the consequences of imperfect human judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The security limitations of the CAN bus communication protocol can be attributed to the fact that the CAN standard was primarily developed to meet the realtime communication needs without significant concern for security. The ever increasing trend of adding remote interfaces to electronic control units inside modern vehicles only makes the problem worse. Over the years, researchers have identified numerous security problems which include multiple ways to gain access to the bus and several critical vehicular functionalities that can be abused. Further, the limitations of the protocol hinders the development of a simple, cost-effective and efficient solution. Consequently, despite numerous security solutions being proposed, the existing solutions carry notable trade-offs in terms of efficiency, cost or security. Surprisingly though, there exists a simple fix that is efficient, cost-effective, secure and incrementally deployable: a reverse-firewall. Referred to in this paper as an icewall, our observed fix can be effective against a major class of packet-injection attacks and many denial of service attacks. However, it can be vulnerable to some attacks that leverage on a human driver's imperfect judgment to manipulate vehicle controls.
Future work will be focused on practical implementation of the icewall. The implementation will entail practical tests to determine optimal configuration parameters to make icewall more robust. Further, actual numbers on the efficiency, cost of deployment and installation overhead will be determined. The results will allow objective comparison of icewall against other security measures.
